Compliance Corder covers articles related to employment decisions due diligence.

Revised FCRA Summary of Rights form released

Did you know that a revised version of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) Summary of Rights form was released a few months ago?

If the answer is “no,” don’t worry. The form was not published in the Federal Register and appeared under the radar without an announcement.

The FCRA mandates that employers are required to provide a disclosure and obtain written authorization from any applicant or employee prior to conducting a background check. If the employer decides to take an “adverse action” against the applicant or employee based on the results of the background check, the employer must provide the individual with a copy of the background check and the Summary of Rights form under the FCRA.

The revised form does not require a lot of adjustments for employers. Some of the government addresses found on the last page were changed and all references to Maine’s laws were removed. Earlier this year, the state repealed its mini-FCRA to adopt the federal FCRA.

View the new Summary of Rights form.

NYC Commission issues legal enforcement guidance on employment credit checks

The New York City Commission recently issued interpretive legal enforcement guidance clarifying some of the exemptions in the City’s Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act (“SCDEA”), as well as recordkeeping requirements and penalties.

As we reported previously, effective September 3, 2015, the SCDEA amends the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”) to make requesting and using consumer credit history for hiring and other employment purposes, with certain exceptions, an unlawful discriminatory practice.

The SCDEA defines “consumer credit history” as an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or payment history, as indicated by: (a) a consumer credit report; (b) credit score; or (c) information an employer obtains directly from the individual regarding details about (1) credit accounts, including the individual’s number of credit accounts, late or missed payments, charged-off debts, items in collections, credit limit, prior credit report inquiries, or (2) bankruptcies, judgments or liens.”

It remains unclear whether the law bans only inquiries, but not public record searches, for bankruptcies, judgments or liens. Under the SCDEA, a consumer credit report includes “any written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or credit history,” and given the broad scope of “any  written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency” caution should be taken regarding these searches and even for civil litigation, as such public records may reveal credit-related information that New York City employers are prohibited from using.

While the SCDEA generally establishes eight categories of exemptions, such as those of individuals required to be bonded under city, state, or federal law which are self-explanatory, there has been much speculation as to the scope of others. In its FAQs, the guidance specifically provides that the exemptions do not cover most low-level employees including, but not limited to, bank tellers, cashiers, salespeople, clerical workers, administrative staff, restaurant/bar workers, and private security employees.

Interpretation about non-clerical positions having regular access to trade secrets is also included in the guidance. The SCDEA defines “trade secrets” as “information that: (a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means, by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy; and (c) can reasonably be said to be the end product of significant innovation.”

The SCDEA limits the trade secret definition to exclude “general proprietary company information such as handbooks and policies” and “access to or the use of client, customer, or mailing lists.” Consistent with this definition and the broad scope of the NYCHRL, “trade secrets” do not include information such as recipes, formulas, customer lists, processes, and other information regularly collected in the course of business or regularly used by entry-level and non-salaried employees and supervisors or managers of such employees.

The guidance emphasizes that all exemptions to coverage under the SCDEA’s anti-discrimination provisions are to be construed narrowly. Employers may claim an exemption to defend against liability, but they have the burden of proving the exemption by a preponderance of the evidence. No exemption applies to an entire employer or industry–exemptions apply only to positions or roles, and not to individual applicants or employees. The law does permits employers to request credit information in response to any lawful subpoena, court order, or law enforcement investigation.

An employer claiming an exemption must show that the position or role falls under one of the eight  general position categories referenced previously. Employers availing themselves of the exemptions should inform applicants or employees of the claimed exemption, and should also keep a record of their use of such exemptions for a period of five years from the date an exemption is used. Keeping an exemption log will help the employer respond to the Commission’s requests for information.

The guidance sets forth civil penalties for violations of the law (up to $250,000 for willful, wanton, or malicious violations, and up to $125,000 for other violations) in addition to other remedies available under the NYCHRL.

Read the SCDEA, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-102(29), 8-107(9)(d), (24); Local Law No. 37 (2015)

Access the interpretive guidance, FAQs and other information about the credit check law here.

 

Florida court allows FCRA suit against Whole Foods to move forward

Reinforcing the importance of complying with even the most technical FCRA requirements, a federal court in Florida allowed a former employee to move forward with his suit against Whole Foods Market Group.

In the putative class action, the plaintiff, who was terminated in June 2013 after the employer conducted a background check on plaintiff and other existing employees, charges that Whole Foods violated the FCRA, and specifically, points to the forms the plaintiff signed when he applied for employment. A “Disclosure Statement” provided: “By this document

[Whole Foods] discloses to you that a consumer report regarding your credit history, criminal history and other background information and/or an investigative consumer report containing information as to your character, general reputation, personal characteristics and/or mode of living may be obtained from personal interviews or other sources in connection with your application for any purpose at any time during your employment.”

The plaintiff was also given a “Consent and Release of Information” form, which stated: “I further understand and authorize [Whole Foods] or those authorized by them to procure a consumer report on me as part of a process of consideration as an employee … I release all parties from liability for any damages which may result from the disclosure of any information outlined herein.”

Although Whole Foods intended for the Disclosure Statement to satisfy Section 1681(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA and each form was a separate single page document, the simultaneous presentation of the consent form rendered the disclosure meaningless, the plaintiff argued. Whole Foods knew that it was required to provide a stand-alone form, the plaintiff added, citing FCRA-related articles posted online by the third-party the company used to run the background checks.

The court agreed. “Based on the allegations, with all inferences drawn in favor of plaintiff, if both the disclosure and the consent forms combined and read as one document with the waiver and release included simultaneously with the disclosure, the complaint states a claim for relief,” the judge said, denying Whole Foods’ motion to dismiss the suit. The court also allowed the plaintiff’s contention that Whole Foods “willfully” violated the FCRA to move forward. Under the statute, reckless and knowing violations constitute willful violations, the court noted, and the plaintiff presented sufficient allegations that the defendant knew it was required to provide a stand-alone form separate from the employment application and yet failed to do so.

“The allegations that defendant had access to legal advice and guidance from the FTC yet it knew that its conduct was inconsistent with that guidance and the plain terms of the statute, are sufficient to withstand attack at this stage of the proceedings on a motion to dismiss,” the judge wrote.

The decision provides an important reminder to employers that class actions alleging technical violations of the FCRA, particularly Section 1681(b)(2)(A)(i), remain popular with plaintiffs with statutory damages from $100 to $1,000 for a willful violation available.

Whole Foods is facing an identical suit in California federal court while other companies have settled similar cases for significant amounts, such as the recent deal Publix Super Markets struck with a class in Tennessee federal court for $6.8 million, a $2.5 million payout by Domino’s Pizza, and a settlement agreement for $3 million between grocery chain Food Lion and job applicants.

Read the court order here.

U.S. Supreme Court case offers window into CFPB’s position on the FCRA

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a closely followed case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) that will have great significance on privacy law. In connection with this case, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) offered a glimpse of its stance on the FCRA in an amicus brief recently filed with the U.S. Supreme Court.

In 2012, the Bureau took over the enforcement reins of the FCRA from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Since then, the industry has watched for signs on how the Bureau would tackle its new job, with few clues. But in an amicus brief filed jointly with the Solicitor General in Spokeo v. Robins, the CFPB weighed in, taking a consumer-friendly position on the statute.

The dispute began when Robins claimed that Spokeo ran afoul of the FCRA. The spokeo.com site allows users to obtain information about other individuals like address, phone number, employment information, and economic data such as mortgage value and investments. Robins sued after finding incorrect information about himself on the site, alleging that Spokeo was a consumer reporting agency (CRA) under the FCRA and sold “consumer reports” but failed to comply with the various statutory requirements by neglecting to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information reported on its site and failing to provide notice of statutory responsibilities to purchasers of its reports.

Relying on Section 1681n of the FCRA, which grants consumers a cause of action against an entity that negligently or willfully violates “any requirement imposed

[under the FCRA] with respect to [that] consumer,” Robins filed a putative class action. A federal district court dismissed the suit for a lack of standing but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The federal appellate panel held that Robins sufficiently alleged an injury in fact because Congress created a right of action to enforce a statutory provision, demonstrating intent to create a statutory right.

Spokeo petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case. The CFPB filed the amicus brief, siding with the plaintiff and arguing that the justices should deny the writ of certiorari. The Bureau argued to the Court that the statutorily created cause of action found in the FCRA satisfied the injury required for Article III standing. While recognizing that Congress does not have unlimited power to define the class of plaintiffs who may sue in federal court, the CFPB said the legislature “may grant individuals statutory rights that, when violated, confer standing, and the clear language of the FCRA did just that.”

“FCRA thus grants an individual consumer a statutory entitlement to be free from a CRA’s actual dissemination of inaccurate information about him when the CRA fails to employ ‘reasonable procedures’ to assure the information’s accuracy,” according to the CFPB’s brief. A CRA’s willful failure to follow reasonable procedures to ensure that an accurate report about a consumer is disseminated violates a ‘requirement imposed under [FCRA] with respect to [that] consumer.’ It is also a concrete and particularized injury to the consumer because it involves the actual, specific, and non-abstract act of disseminating information about the particular consumer.” This reading – recognizing a legally protected interest in consumer privacy – “is particularly salient in modern-day society given the proliferation of large databases and the ease and rapidity with which information about individuals can be transmitted and retransmitted across the Internet,” the CFPB added, as “public dissemination of inaccurate personal information about the plaintiff is a form of ‘concrete harm’ that courts have traditionally acted to redress, whether or not the plaintiff can prove some further consequential injury.”

Read the CFPB’s amicus brief in Spokeo v. Robins here.

Read the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here.

 

June 12th, 2015|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , |

New law limits credit checks for New York City employers

New York City has joined the growing list of employers placing limits on credit checks. On April 16, the City Council overwhelmingly voted in favor of a bill prohibiting the use of credit checks in most employment situations. Mayor Bill De Blasio signed the legislation on May 6, amending the city’s Human Rights Law to make the use of credit history for hiring and other employment purposes, with certain exceptions, an unlawful discriminatory practice. Set to take effect on September 3, 2015, the law will have a sizable impact on employers in New York City. A review of current policies and procedures to determine if any exceptions apply is key, while employers with a statewide presence should consider whether to continue credit checks in other locations where they remain legal.

As defined by the law, “consumer credit history” means an individual’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or payment history, as indicated by: (a) a consumer credit report; (b) credit score; or (c) information an employer obtains directly from the individual regarding (1) details about credit accounts, including the individual’s number of credit accounts, late or missed payments, charged-off debts, items in collections, credit limit, prior credit report inquiries, or (2) bankruptcies, judgments or liens. The law further provides that “a consumer credit report shall include any written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or credit history.”

Importantly, employers are prohibited not just from the request or use of credit history for applicants, but also from using credit history as a factor in employment decisions for current employees in “compensation, or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”

When initially introduced, the proposal featured no exceptions to the ban on credit checks. But over the course of the past year, limited exceptions were added to the bill. As enacted, the legislation permits the use of credit checks for prospective employees of broker-dealers who must register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) as well as for police officers and other public officials in a position involving a “high degree of public trust.” Additional exceptions allow a review of credit history when required by state or federal law or regulations; for positions when an employee must possess a security clearance or has “regular access” to intelligence or national security information; for non-clerical positions with access to “trade secrets;” for computer security positions when the employee’s duties include the ability to modify digital security systems; and for employees with signing authority over third-party funds or assets greater than $10,000 or fiduciary responsibility to an employer with the authority to enter into financial agreements of $10,000 or more.

The law permits individuals to file a complaint of discrimination with the New York City Commission on Human Rights within a one-year period or a complaint in court, with a three-year statute of limitations. Remedies include back pay, reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs.

New York City joins 12 other jurisdictions that have prohibited credit checks in employment-related decisions, including the city of Chicago as well as California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.

Read the New York City legislation here.

EEOC loses – again – in challenge to background checks

In the latest blow to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (the “EEOC”) attempts to regulate employers’ use of background checks, the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals threw out a case in a scathing opinion that expressed disappointment in the agency’s litigation conduct.

The controversy began in April 2012, when the EEOC released guidance on the issue of criminal background checks for employers. The “Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” emphasized that while the use of criminal history does not violate the statute per se, an employer may run afoul of the law if the checks result in systemic discrimination based on a protected category like race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.

As an alternative, the agency suggested employers strive to perform individualized assessments of prospective employees, and consider factors such as the nature of the crime and its relation to the potential job, as well as the individual’s rehabilitation efforts and the length of time that has passed since the conviction.

The EEOC then followed up with multiple lawsuits alleging that certain employers engaged in the discriminatory use of background checks, disproportionately screening out African-American workers in cases filed against BMW Manufacturing in South Carolina, Dollar General in Illinois, Kaplan Higher Education Company in Ohio, and Freeman Company in Maryland.

To date, all of the lawsuits have been dismissed and the agency has faced criticism about its efforts to pursue such cases from both industry and lawmakers. The most recent critic: the Fourth Circuit.

In the agency’s case against Freeman Company, the EEOC alleged the company’s use of criminal background checks for all applicants and credit checks for “credit sensitive” positions had an unlawful disparate impact on black and male job applicants. To support its case, the agency produced expert reports by an industrial/organizational psychologist. But the federal district court granted summary judgment for Freeman, finding the psychologist’s reports “rife with analytical errors” and “completely unreliable.”

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling, identifying “an alarming number of errors and analytical fallacies” in the reports, “making it impossible to rely on any of his conclusions.” Freeman provided complete background screening logs for thousands of applicants to the EEOC but the psychologist “cherry-picked” data, the court said, omitting information from half of the company’s branch offices while purporting to analyze all the background checks, and further failed to utilize an appropriate sample size, selecting the vast majority of data to focus on before October 14, 2008.

Although the relevant time period extended to August 31, 2011 and Freeman conducted over 1,500 criminal checks and more than 300 credit reviews between October 14, 2008 and August 31, 2011, the psychologist used data from only 19 applicants during that time, just one of whom passed the check.

A “mind-boggling number of errors and unexplained discrepancies” existed in the psychologist’s database, the panel added, rejecting the EEOC’s argument that the mistakes originated in Freeman’s data. The psychologist introduced the errors, the court said, and further managed to introduce fresh errors when he tried to supplement his original reports with corrections.

“The sheer number of mistakes and omissions in the analysis renders it “outside the range where experts might reasonably differ,” the three-judge panel wrote. One of the panelists added a concurring opinion expressing concern with the “EEOC’s disappointing litigation conduct” and continued efforts to defend the psychologist’s work despite other courts reaching similar conclusions about his reports.

“The Commission’s conduct in this case suggets that its exercise of vigilance has been lacking,” according to the concurring opinion. “It would serve the agency well in the future to reconsider how it might better discharge the responsibilities delegated to it or face consquences for failing to do so.”

With public criticism, zero litigation victories, and a counterargument from one defendant that its background check procedures are the same as those conducted by the agency itself, the Fourth Circuit’s decision does not bode well for the future of EEOC challenges to background checks. That said, employers should still be cautious and utilize background reports in a non-discriminatory manner.

Read the EEOC guidance.

Read the opinion in EEOC v. Freeman.

No number, no lawsuit

Tossing a lawsuit alleging religious discrimination, the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals found that an applicant could not sue after refusing to provide his Social Security number to a prospective employer. The plaintiff, an applicant for a position with an energy company, claimed that he had no number because he “disclaimed and disavowed it” on account of his sincerely held religious beliefs.

The company’s refusal to hire the plaintiff violated Title VII and Ohio state law, the complaint charged, requesting both injunctive relief in the form of a job and monetary damages. A federal district court judge dismissed the lawsuit, and the federal appellate panel affirmed.

Courts considering the issue apply a two-step analysis, the Sixth Circuit explained. First, the court determines whether the plaintiff established a “prima facie case of religious discrimination,” which requires proof that the plaintiff “(1) holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) has informed the employer about the conflicts; and (3) was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” If the plaintiff manages to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show it could not “reasonably accommodate” the religious beliefs without “undue hardship.”

This suit failed under the first step, the panel said, because the Internal Revenue Code mandates that employers collect and provide the Social Security numbers of their employees. Because the company’s collection of the plaintiff’s number was a “requirement imposed by law” and not an “employment requirement,” the court had no need to consider the sincerity of the plaintiff’s beliefs.

The panel also noted that every other federal appellate court to consider the issue has concluded “that Title VII does not require an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs if such accommodation would violate a federal statute,” citing decisions from the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as federal district courts in Michigan and Virginia.

All of the courts have arrived “at the same, sensible conclusion: ‘

[A]n employer is not liable under Title VII when accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal … law,” the Sixth Circuit wrote. “This conclusion is consistent with Title VII’s text, which says nothing that might license an employer to disregard other federal statutes in the name of reasonably accommodating an employee’s religious practices.”

For employers, the decision provides even greater peace of mind. With five federal appellate courts in agreement that a religious discrimination claim will not stand against an employer that complies with federal requirements to collect an applicant’s Social Security number, companies do not have to worry about the merits of a Title VII lawsuit under such circumstances.

Read the opinion.

Do you know about specialty consumer reports?

Credit reports are a part of life, whether applying for a credit card or purchasing a home. But what about specialty consumer reports?

Many people are unaware that dozens of other types of consumer reports exist, filled with information about medical and prescription history, for example, or insurance claims. Specialty consumer reports gather data from a wide variety of sources including information provided by consumers on applications (such as an apartment lease or a wireless phone contract) as well as public documents like criminal records and marriage licenses.

The reports provide information geared for a specific industry. A truck driving company might purchase reports that detail a job applicant’s driving record and motor vehicle insurance claims while an insurer will review a report with claims filed by a homeowner to check an individual’s historic use of insurance policies. Other niche reports provide data on loan balances, information about any bounced checks, and bank account history for lenders; another company tracks consumers’ product returns and will alert large retailers for fraud prevention purposes.

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) entitles consumers to one free report per year from any nationwide credit or specialty reporting agency (plus another free report if an adverse action has been taken, or the consumer disputes an item in the report that was corrected).

Recently, consumer rights group Consumer Action focused on the issue of specialty consumer reports in an “Insider’s Guide to Specialty Consumer Reports: A Guide to Obtaining, Understanding and Managing Your Information,” complete with a directory of furnishers. Staffers went through the process of requesting their own reports to help provide information for consumers about the types of reports available and their rights to request reports or correct errors.

Access the Consumer Action guide.

Read the directory of specialty consumer report furnishers.

Trend of suing employers for technical FCRA violations continues

The threat of a multi-million potential class action lawsuit alleging technical violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) continues to haunt employers, even where the plaintiffs have alleged or proven no harm.

Pursuant to the statute, employers are required to “provide prior written notice before they can procure a consumer report about any employee or applicant for employment.” Just as important, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) adds that the notice must be given “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.”

Seeking to take advantage of the statutory damages available under the FCRA – from $100 up to $1,000 for a willful violation – plaintiffs have challenged employers’ use of a disclosure form that combined the written notice to procure a consumer report with other information or documents, such as an application form.

The trend to sue for FCRA technical violations was started by Singleton v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC in the U.S. District Court of Maryland (case no. 8:11-cv-01823-DKC) where the court ruled that inclusion of a liability release in the employer’s disclosure/authorization form violates the FCRA. Domino’s ended up reaching a settlement with the plaintiffs in 2013 for $2.5 million.

Also taking a strict reading of the statutory language, the Western District Court of Pennsylvania ruled in 2013 in Reardon v. Closetmaid Corporation (case no. 2:0S-cv-01730) that an employer could be liable for the combination of a disclosure/authorization with a liability waiver, and granted summary judgment in favor of the roughly 1,800 job applicants.

In a more recent example, a class of applicants sued Publix Super Markets in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (case no. 3:14-cv-00720) also based on a violation of the sole disclosure requirement and release of liability. With Domino’s and Closetmaid’s payouts looming over its head and a class of 90,000, Publix agreed to settle the claims for $6.8 million earlier last year.

Although these companies opted not to fight the suits on their merits, a defendant in a case filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California (case no. 1:14-742-WBS-BAM) did and won dismissal in October 2014. Syed v. M-I LLC involved identical claims but the judge reached a contrary decision, finding that the FCRA text was not as clear-cut as the plaintiff claimed. Immediately following the subsection mandating the sole disclosure of the employer’s intent to procure a consumer report is a provision that states that the consumer’s authorization is to “be made on the document referred to in clause (i)” – “that is, the same document as the disclosure,” the court noted, and “…thus, the statute itself suggests that the term ‘solely’ is more flexible than at first it may appear…”

The Syed decision is the second one that may give hope to employers facing similar suits. (There are at least six class actions pending.) But the obvious answer for companies looking to avoid the problem entirely is simple: use a standalone disclosure/authorization form that is separate from any other information or documents.

Medical marijuana laws put employers in a tough spot

The growing number of jurisdictions permitting medical marijuana is putting employers in a tough position. One the one hand, marijuana remains illegal under federal law and a workforce under the influence isn’t much of a workforce at all. On the other hand, 23 states and the District of Columbia now permit the use of marijuana for regulated medical purposes and some state laws include anti-discrimination provisions prohibiting employers from taking action against employees based on their status as a registered medical marijuana user.

A first-of-its-kind lawsuit demonstrates the conundrum. In December, the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit in a Rhode Island state court on behalf of an individual who allegedly was denied an internship after she disclosed that she lawfully carried a medical marijuana card for severe migraines.

According to the complaint, the company told the applicant that she had been rejected because of her status as a cardholder, and despite promises not to bring medical marijuana on the premises or come to work under the influence, the applicant was denied the position.

The lawsuit charges that the company violated Rhode Island’s medical marijuana law which prohibits schools, employers, and landlords from refusing “to enroll, employ, or lease to, or otherwise penalize, a person solely for his or her status as a cardholder.” The complaint – which also includes allegations of disability discrimination under state law – seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Employers in states permitting medical marijuana would be well-advised to review their relevant law when considering marijuana use or marijuana-related criminal records in employment decisions. While Rhode Island is not alone in including an anti-discrimination requirement in its law, joined by Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, and New York, other states – including California, Massachusetts, and New York – are clear that employers have no obligation to accommodate an employee’s medical marijuana use or permit them to work under the influence.

Read the complaint.

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