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FCRA

California’s overlapping background check laws

For many years, employers have struggled with California’s overlapping statutes governing the use of background checks. Now, the state’s highest court has weighed in, ruling that compliance with the requirements of both laws is mandatory, even where the laws overlap.

A little history is necessary to understand the situation. In 1970, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The law defined the term “consumer report” to include an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.” The FCRA distinguished between consumer reports that contained information obtained by personal interviews and consumer reports gathered by other means.

The California legislature responded with two state analogues in 1975: the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) and the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA). Modeled on the FCRA, the statutes had similar purposes and were intended to serve complementary goals.

As originally enacted, the ICRAA applied to consumer reports that included character information obtained only through personal interviews. It defined an “investigative consumer report” as one “in which information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained through any means.” The statute requires that the person procuring the report provide the consumer a “clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing” and that the consumer in turn provide a written authorization for the report’s procurement.

Lawmakers took a slightly different approach with CCRAA, which defined a “consumer credit report” as “any written, oral or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or is expected to be used … for … employment purposes.” The definition excluded “any report containing information solely on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer reported on, or others with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information.”

In 1998, the California legislature amended ICRAA to eliminate the personal interview limitation and expand the statute’s scope to include character information obtained under CCRAA or “obtained through any means.”

Since then, CCRAA continues to govern consumer reports that include character information obtained from a source other than personal interviews, as long as those reports contain information “bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity.”

What does all this mean for employers? And how did the California Supreme Court get involved?

The two statutes came to the attention of the court when a group of current and former school bus drivers filed suit against their employers, First Student and First Transit, as well as the investigative consumer reporting agency (ICRA) that conducted background checks on the drivers. Eileen Connor led the class action.

After First Student acquired the company where Connor worked as a driver, it requested that the ICRA run background checks to confirm that Connor and the other workers were properly qualified to perform their job duties. The background reports elicited information about the employees’ criminal records, sex offender registries, address history, driving records and employment history.

Prior to conducting the background checks, First Student sent Connor a “Safety Packet” booklet. The booklet included an “Investigative Consumer Report Disclosure and Release” that provided authorization for the ICRA to prepare a consumer report or investigative consumer report. The notice included a checkbox that generally described Connor’s rights under ICRAA, informed her that she could check the box if she wanted to receive a copy of the report and released First Student from all claims and damages arising out of or relating to its background investigation if the box was checked.

Connor filed suit, arguing that the notice failed to satisfy ICRAA’s specific requirements and that First Student neglected to obtain her written authorization to conduct the background check, as required by ICRAA.

First Student asked the court to dismiss the suit, arguing that ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the lawsuit because it overlaps with CCRAA and that the notice satisfied CCRAA.

The California Supreme Court found that while the statutes overlap to some degree, achieving compliance with both did not render ICRAA unconstitutional. The two statutes were not intended to be exclusive of each other, the court said, and potential employers can comply with both statutes without undermining the purpose of either.

“If an employer seeks a consumer’s credit records exclusively, then the employer need only comply with CCRAA,” the court explained. “An employer seeking other information that is obtained by any means must comply with ICRAA. In the event that any other information revealed in an ICRAA background check contains a subject’s credit information and the two statutes thus overlap, a regulated party is expected to know and follow the requirements of both statutes, even if that requires greater formality in obtaining a consumer’s credit records.”

First Student complained that because the ICRAA and CCRAA cover the same subject matter, it was unclear which statute applied in the context of employment background checks. But the court disagreed. Connor’s report, for example, fell within the scope of both statutes and “such a duality does not make legal compliance particularly difficult, must less impossible,” the court said.

“Any partial overlap between the statutes does not render one superfluous or unconstitutionally vague,” the court wrote. “They can coexist because both acts are sufficiently clear and each act regulates information that the other does not.”

The California Supreme Court opinion was a loss for First Student and the ICRA, as the court found the defendants had no excuse for not complying with both statutes. For employers more generally, the decision sends an important message: compliance with the requirements of both ICRAA and CCRAA is mandatory, even where the two statutes overlap.

October 1st, 2018|Employment Decisions, Legislation|

New FCRA Summary of Rights

Effective September 21, 2018, section 605A(i) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), added by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act requires that a new notice (which explains consumer rights about placing fraud alerts and credit freezes with nationwide consumer reporting agencies (NCRAs)) be included whenever a consumer is required to receive a summary of rights under FCRA’s section 609. Although the new notice requirement is aimed at NCRAs and potentially consumer reporting agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau published a revised “FCRA Summary of Rights” form on September 13, 2018 (which includes the new notice and updates certain contact information) and the conservative approach for employers is to use the new form also.

The new version of the “FCRA Summary of Rights” form can be accessed HERE.

September 18th, 2018|Employment Decisions|

Reminder to California employers about requirements when taking adverse action based on a criminal record

With the enactment of an updated ban-the-box statute (the Fair Chance Act) on January 1, 2018, employers in California may need a refresher on how to take adverse action based on the criminal record of an applicant.

For those businesses located in Los Angeles, the requirements take on an additional level of complication due to slight differences in the city’s ordinance.

Pursuant to California law, employers with five or more employees must wait until after a conditional offer of employment has been made to ask any questions about a criminal history. This means inquiries about convictions, running a background check or other efforts to find out about an applicant’s criminal past.

As an aside, several types of criminal records are not allowed to be used by employers in the hiring process (including juvenile records, diversions and deferrals, non-felony marijuana convictions that are more than two years old and arrests that did not lead to a conviction).If the employer decides not to hire the applicant, it must conduct an individualized assessment of the conviction at issue to evaluate whether it has a “direct and adverse relationship with the specific duties of the job that justify denying the applicant the position.”

The applicant needs to be notified of the potential for adverse action based on the conviction. Such notice must identify the conviction at issue and include a copy of any background check report; the employer must also provide a deadline for the applicant to submit additional information with regard to the conviction (such as rehabilitation efforts or other mitigating circumstances).

Federal law also kicks in. For those employers that intend to rely in whole or in part on a background check report to take adverse action such as rescinding a conditional job offer, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) mandates that applicants be given a pre-adverse action notice, a copy of the report and a notice of rights.

Once the applicant has provided any information and the employer makes a final decision, a second notice is required. This time, the notice should inform the applicant of the final adverse action, explain any procedure in place for the applicant to challenge the decision or request reconsideration and describe the applicant’s right to file a complaint with the state’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH). If the FCRA has been triggered by the use of a background check report, the employer must also provide the applicant with an adverse action notice that contains FCRA-required text.

While this process may seem onerous, employers that hire workers in Los Angeles face additional requirements under the city’s Fair Chance Initiative for Hiring Ordinance (FCIHO). The law, which took effect on January 22, 2017, applies to employers with 10 or more workers (defined to include individuals who perform at least two hours of work on average in Los Angeles and are covered by the state’s minimum wage law).

The FCIHO has a narrower definition of a “conditional offer of employment” than that under state law – here, an offer of employment to an applicant “is conditioned only on an assessment of the applicant’s criminal history, if any, and the duties and responsibilities of the employment position.”

Regardless of the source of criminal history, if an employer elects not to hire an applicant, a written assessment that “effectively links the specific aspects of the applicant’s criminal history with risks inherent in the duties of the employment position sought by the applicant” must be performed.

This assessment needs to be provided to the applicant as part of the “fair chance process,” along with any other documentation or information used by the employer as well as a pre-adverse action notice. Again, if a background check report was used, the FCRA requirements apply. The applicant also receives an opportunity to share information the employer should consider before making a final decision, such as evidence of rehabilitation.

After at least five business days, the employer may make a final decision. If the applicant provided additional documentation or information, the employer is obligated to consider it and conduct a written reassessment. If the employer decides to take adverse action against the applicant anyway, the employer must notify the applicant and provide a copy of the reassessment along with the adverse action notice.

June 21st, 2018|Employment Decisions, Legislation|

Reminder to New York City employers about requirements when taking adverse action based on a criminal record

Let’s say you are an employer in New York City with a position to fill. During the hiring process, you learn that an applicant has a criminal conviction. What should you do if you elect not to hire her and want to avoid breaking the law?

The answer is not simple.

In New York State, it is unlawful to deny employment or take an adverse action against an applicant because of a criminal conviction unless a direct relationship exists between the criminal offense(s) and the specific position sought, or the employment of the individual would involve an “unreasonable risk” to property or to the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.

Before an adverse employment decision may be based on a conviction record, Article 23-A of the New York State Correction law provides a list of factors that employers must consider:

  • New York’s stated public policy “to encourage the licensure and employment of those with previous criminal convictions.”
  • The specific duties and responsibilities related to the employment sought or held.
  • The bearing, if any, the criminal offense(s) for which the individual was convicted will have on her fitness or ability to perform one or more of the position’s duties or responsibilities.
  • The time elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense(s).
  • The age of the individual at the time of the occurrence of the criminal offense(s).
  • The seriousness of the criminal offense(s).
  • Any information produced by the individual (or on her behalf) addressing rehabilitation and good conduct. Any certificate of relief from disabilities or certificate of good conduct creates a presumption of rehabilitation with regard to the offense specified in the certificate.
  • The legitimate interest of the employer in protecting property and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.

An employer must apply each of these factors on a case-by-case basis before making an adverse employment decision. If all the factors are properly weighed and an employer makes a reasonable, good faith decision that the criminal offense bears a direct relationship to the job duties or that the applicant’s employment would involve an unreasonable risk to safety and welfare, it is not illegal to deny employment.

New York law does require that if employment is denied because of a conviction record, a statement setting forth the reasons for the denial must be provided upon request of the applicant, in writing and within 30 days.

Another wrinkle for employers who use a third-party to perform a background check: the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). If an employer elects not to hire an employee based in whole or in part on the background check, the statute requires the applicant receive a copy of the background check report, a notice of intent to take adverse action and a notice of rights.

Employers in New York City, however, have additional legislation to contend with. The Fair Chance Act (FCA), enacted in 2015, applies to employers with at least four employees. Covered employers are prohibited from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal history until after a conditional offer of employment has been extended.

Assuming the offer has been made and an employer has learned of a conviction that proves troubling, the FCA sets forth several requirements for an employer to rescind the offer without running afoul of the statute.

After the factors of Article 23-A have been applied, an employer must follow a “fair chance process.” This involves providing applicants with a copy of their background check report – and if a third party was used to perform the check, the FCRA notice of rights and a notice of intent to take adverse action, per the FCRA – and any other information relied upon in connection with the employment decision, such as Internet searches or written summaries of oral conversations.

In addition, employers must provide an analysis of the Article 23-A factors (the New York City Commission for Human Rights (NYCCHR) provides a Fair Chance Act Notice Form for employers to use)) and the opportunity for the applicant to address the criminal history at issue and present any mitigating information or material prior to the employment offer being revoked.

The prospective position must be held open for at least three business days from the applicant’s receipt of the necessary documentation to allow time for a response. Further, if the employer used a third-party background check company, the FCRA also mandates that applicants receive a reasonable period of time to respond (the Federal Trade Commission has suggested that five business days would be sufficient in most circumstances).

The Notice Form requires employers to evaluate each Article 23-A factor and select which exception – direct relationship or unreasonable risk – it is relying upon, with the burden on the employer (and space provided on the Notice Form) to articulate its conclusion. In addition to the Notice Form, employers that made use of a background check report must provide an applicant with an adverse action notice required by the FCRA.

If an employer rescinds a conditional offer after receiving information about the applicant’s criminal history, the FCA established a rebuttable presumption that the withdrawal was due to criminal history.

To rebut the presumption, an employer must demonstrate that the revocation was due to a permitted reason, such as the results of a medical examination (where an exam is otherwise permitted), material information the employer could not have known before the conditional offer was made and would have kept the employer from making the offer in the first place or evidence that the employer did not have knowledge of the applicant’s criminal history prior to revoking the conditional offer.

Some employers are exempt from the FCA when hiring for certain positions if federal, state or local laws require a criminal background check or prohibit employment based on certain criminal convictions. Companies in the financial services industry or employers hiring police and peace officers, for example, may not be subject to the law’s requirements. Those employers who believe they are exempt must inform an individual upon application and keep a record of their use of the exemption.

June 21st, 2018|Employment Decisions, Legislation|

Phony job applicants targeting employers to collect on FCRA violations

As we reported throughout the year, class-actions brought against employers under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) alleging hyper-technical violations are proliferating, with several resulting in multi-million dollar settlements.

But there appears to be a new development in this area. According to a National Law Review article, phony job applicants who have no intention of being employed with the targeted companies are submitting employment applications solely to position themselves as plaintiffs in class action litigation and potentially get a windfall settlement. The National Law Review article reports that the fake applicants typically fill out an online job application (usually with companies that have nationwide operations), sign the background check authorization, and then, after receiving an offer or rejection letter send a demand letter stating that the employer’s background check disclosure form or process does not comply with the requirements imposed by the FCRA and demand huge payouts to settle their claims  and avoid the filing of a class action lawsuit.

The FCRA provides for statutory damages ranging from $100 to $1,000 per violation for non-compliance with the FCRA’s notice and disclosure requirements, even where the plaintiff has suffered no actual harm or damag

December 22nd, 2015|FCRA, Lawsuit|

Mini FCRA update: Georgia enacts new law, California law mired in uncertainty

Enacted in 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) provides federal regulation of consumer reporting agencies that provide consumer reports to third parties.

In the 45 years since the FCRA took effect, several states have passed their own version of the statute to provide additional protections for consumers. Colloquially referred to as “mini” FCRAs, the laws can be found in Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, and Washington.

Joining the group: Georgia, where House Bill 328 took effect on July 1. The new law applies to consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) that “conduct business” within the state, defined as those entities that “provide information to any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or any other group however organized that is domiciled within this state or whose principal place of business” is located within Georgia’s borders.

A CRA encompasses any person or entity “which, for monetary fees or dues or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”

For its part, a consumer report broadly includes “any written, oral, or other communication of any information bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for purposes of credit, insurance, or employment.”

As it closely tracks the federal FCRA, Georgia’s law provides that a CRA that furnishes consumer reports for employment purposes in compliance with the federal statute will be in compliance with the state version.

While Georgia’s new law already took effect, other states have struggled with application of their mini FCRAs.

For example, in 2013, a federal court judge California ruled that one of the state’s two FCRA corrollaries, the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA), was unconstitutionally vague in Roe v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc. The case involved an anonymous plaintiff who sued when she failed to obtain employment.  She argued she didn’t get the job as a result of an allegedly inaccurate background check furnished by the defendant to her prospective employer in violation of both the FCRA and the ICRAA.

The defendant argued that the ICRAA was unconstitutionally vague as applied and the court agreed. In addition to the FCRA and the ICRAA, California had previously enacted the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA), a law that governs consumer credit checks. The interplay between the CCRAA and ICRAA resulted in confusion for covered entities, the court found, as criminal background information about consumers was regulated by both laws, leaving companies uncertain about which statute’s requirements actually applied.

Although the plaintiff appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the federal appellate panel dismissed the appeal for procedural reasons; on remand, the federal district court later dismissed the case with prejudice in December 2013. However, the opinion in Roe remains valid law in the state, leaving a shadow of uncertainty hanging over the ICRAA.

Read Georgia’s House Bill 328.

Read Roe v. LexisNexis Risk Solutions, Inc.

September 23rd, 2015|Employment Decisions, FCRA|

California’s marijuana laws present challenges for employers

Even for those not partaking in marijuana, the various California laws regulating its use can be confusing – particularly for employers.

The trend in state legislatures to permit the recreational and/or medicinal use of marijuana began with California’s Compassionate Use Act in 1996, which allowed state residents to use the drug for medical purposes and decriminalized possession of less than 28 grams. Complicating the matter, however: marijuana use remains prohibited by federal law.

With limited use of marijuana legal in the state, how can employers find out about a worker’s use of the drug or limit it without running afoul of state law?

Employers have two options, either try to get their hands on historical information, such as criminal convictions, or seek out current input via drug testing.

Criminal history related to drugs in many instances is off-limits for employers. Job applicants cannot be required to disclose an arrest that did not result in a conviction or participation in a pretrial or post-trial diversion program. Any criminal history that has been expunged, sealed, or dismissed will be unavailable as are marijuana-related convictions dating back more than two years.

While California has not banned the box for private employers, local jurisdictions such as San Francisco have, requiring employers to wait until after a live interview or determining that an applicant meets the qualifications for the position before inquiring into criminal history. Background checks – whether performed in-house or by a third party – require compliance with federal law (the Fair Credit and Reporting Act (FCRA) as well as California’s counterpart, the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (although the legality of the state statute is unclear, see story below for more detail). And such investigations into applicants’ history are a current target for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission – which has filed multiple lawsuits (https://scherzer.co/eeoc-loses-again-in-challenge-to-background-checks/) against employers alleging their background checks constitute disparate impact discrimination against protected groups like African-Americans – and a popular basis for class actions. Recent cases have settled with multi-million awards, including a $2.5 million payout by Domino’s Pizza and a $6.8 million deal between Publix Super Markets and a class of applicants alleging the company violated the FCRA.

Drug tests can be viable option for employers. Once a job offer has been made, an employer may require an applicant to pass a drug test as a condition of employment (as long as all potential employees are subject to the same requirement). After a worker has been hired, drug tests may be used if an employer has a reasonable suspicion that the employee is under the influence. Certain jobs – such as those in the transportation industry like truck drivers – may permit such testing more freely. If a test comes back positive, employers do have the discretion to discipline, terminate, or choose not to hire an applicant even if the individual legally holds a medical marijuana card issued by the state. In addition, despite the requirements under the Americans With Disabilities Act and California state law to provide reasonable accommodations to employees considered disabled, neither federal nor state law requires employers to permit marijuana use as such an accommodation.

September 23rd, 2015|Criminal Activity, Employment Decisions|

Revised FCRA Summary of Rights form released

Did you know that a revised version of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) Summary of Rights form was released a few months ago?

If the answer is “no,” don’t worry. The form was not published in the Federal Register and appeared under the radar without an announcement.

The FCRA mandates that employers are required to provide a disclosure and obtain written authorization from any applicant or employee prior to conducting a background check. If the employer decides to take an “adverse action” against the applicant or employee based on the results of the background check, the employer must provide the individual with a copy of the background check and the Summary of Rights form under the FCRA.

The revised form does not require a lot of adjustments for employers. Some of the government addresses found on the last page were changed and all references to Maine’s laws were removed. Earlier this year, the state repealed its mini-FCRA to adopt the federal FCRA.

View the new Summary of Rights form.

September 23rd, 2015|Educational Series, Employment Decisions|

Florida court allows FCRA suit against Whole Foods to move forward

Reinforcing the importance of complying with even the most technical FCRA requirements, a federal court in Florida allowed a former employee to move forward with his suit against Whole Foods Market Group.

In the putative class action, the plaintiff, who was terminated in June 2013 after the employer conducted a background check on plaintiff and other existing employees, charges that Whole Foods violated the FCRA, and specifically, points to the forms the plaintiff signed when he applied for employment. A “Disclosure Statement” provided: “By this document

[Whole Foods] discloses to you that a consumer report regarding your credit history, criminal history and other background information and/or an investigative consumer report containing information as to your character, general reputation, personal characteristics and/or mode of living may be obtained from personal interviews or other sources in connection with your application for any purpose at any time during your employment.”

The plaintiff was also given a “Consent and Release of Information” form, which stated: “I further understand and authorize [Whole Foods] or those authorized by them to procure a consumer report on me as part of a process of consideration as an employee … I release all parties from liability for any damages which may result from the disclosure of any information outlined herein.”

Although Whole Foods intended for the Disclosure Statement to satisfy Section 1681(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA and each form was a separate single page document, the simultaneous presentation of the consent form rendered the disclosure meaningless, the plaintiff argued. Whole Foods knew that it was required to provide a stand-alone form, the plaintiff added, citing FCRA-related articles posted online by the third-party the company used to run the background checks.

The court agreed. “Based on the allegations, with all inferences drawn in favor of plaintiff, if both the disclosure and the consent forms combined and read as one document with the waiver and release included simultaneously with the disclosure, the complaint states a claim for relief,” the judge said, denying Whole Foods’ motion to dismiss the suit. The court also allowed the plaintiff’s contention that Whole Foods “willfully” violated the FCRA to move forward. Under the statute, reckless and knowing violations constitute willful violations, the court noted, and the plaintiff presented sufficient allegations that the defendant knew it was required to provide a stand-alone form separate from the employment application and yet failed to do so.

“The allegations that defendant had access to legal advice and guidance from the FTC yet it knew that its conduct was inconsistent with that guidance and the plain terms of the statute, are sufficient to withstand attack at this stage of the proceedings on a motion to dismiss,” the judge wrote.

The decision provides an important reminder to employers that class actions alleging technical violations of the FCRA, particularly Section 1681(b)(2)(A)(i), remain popular with plaintiffs with statutory damages from $100 to $1,000 for a willful violation available.

Whole Foods is facing an identical suit in California federal court while other companies have settled similar cases for significant amounts, such as the recent deal Publix Super Markets struck with a class in Tennessee federal court for $6.8 million, a $2.5 million payout by Domino’s Pizza, and a settlement agreement for $3 million between grocery chain Food Lion and job applicants.

Read the court order here.

June 12th, 2015|Employment Decisions, FCRA, Judgment|

U.S. Supreme Court case offers window into CFPB’s position on the FCRA

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear a closely followed case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”) that will have great significance on privacy law. In connection with this case, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) offered a glimpse of its stance on the FCRA in an amicus brief recently filed with the U.S. Supreme Court.

In 2012, the Bureau took over the enforcement reins of the FCRA from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Since then, the industry has watched for signs on how the Bureau would tackle its new job, with few clues. But in an amicus brief filed jointly with the Solicitor General in Spokeo v. Robins, the CFPB weighed in, taking a consumer-friendly position on the statute.

The dispute began when Robins claimed that Spokeo ran afoul of the FCRA. The spokeo.com site allows users to obtain information about other individuals like address, phone number, employment information, and economic data such as mortgage value and investments. Robins sued after finding incorrect information about himself on the site, alleging that Spokeo was a consumer reporting agency (CRA) under the FCRA and sold “consumer reports” but failed to comply with the various statutory requirements by neglecting to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information reported on its site and failing to provide notice of statutory responsibilities to purchasers of its reports.

Relying on Section 1681n of the FCRA, which grants consumers a cause of action against an entity that negligently or willfully violates “any requirement imposed

[under the FCRA] with respect to [that] consumer,” Robins filed a putative class action. A federal district court dismissed the suit for a lack of standing but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The federal appellate panel held that Robins sufficiently alleged an injury in fact because Congress created a right of action to enforce a statutory provision, demonstrating intent to create a statutory right.

Spokeo petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to take the case. The CFPB filed the amicus brief, siding with the plaintiff and arguing that the justices should deny the writ of certiorari. The Bureau argued to the Court that the statutorily created cause of action found in the FCRA satisfied the injury required for Article III standing. While recognizing that Congress does not have unlimited power to define the class of plaintiffs who may sue in federal court, the CFPB said the legislature “may grant individuals statutory rights that, when violated, confer standing, and the clear language of the FCRA did just that.”

“FCRA thus grants an individual consumer a statutory entitlement to be free from a CRA’s actual dissemination of inaccurate information about him when the CRA fails to employ ‘reasonable procedures’ to assure the information’s accuracy,” according to the CFPB’s brief. A CRA’s willful failure to follow reasonable procedures to ensure that an accurate report about a consumer is disseminated violates a ‘requirement imposed under [FCRA] with respect to [that] consumer.’ It is also a concrete and particularized injury to the consumer because it involves the actual, specific, and non-abstract act of disseminating information about the particular consumer.” This reading – recognizing a legally protected interest in consumer privacy – “is particularly salient in modern-day society given the proliferation of large databases and the ease and rapidity with which information about individuals can be transmitted and retransmitted across the Internet,” the CFPB added, as “public dissemination of inaccurate personal information about the plaintiff is a form of ‘concrete harm’ that courts have traditionally acted to redress, whether or not the plaintiff can prove some further consequential injury.”

Read the CFPB’s amicus brief in Spokeo v. Robins here.

Read the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit here.

 

June 12th, 2015|FCRA, Judgment|
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