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Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions refers to an internal or external resource hub that helps HR teams, managers, and compliance officers navigate the legal requirements tied to employment actions. It ensures decisions are consistent, documented, job‑related, and nondiscriminatory.

Here’s what a strong Compliance Corner usually includes:

  • Legal frameworks — Title VII, ADA, ADEA, FCRA, state laws, and local ordinances.
  • Adverse employment actions — what counts, how to document them, and how to avoid discriminatory impact.
  • Fair Chance hiring — compliant use of criminal history, individualized assessments, and Ban‑the‑Box rules.
  • Background check compliance — proper disclosures, authorizations, and adverse‑action procedures.
  • EEOC guidance — how to ensure decisions are job‑related and consistent with business necessity.
  • Documentation standards — how to record performance issues, investigations, and decision rationale.
  • Consistency in decision‑making — avoiding disparate treatment and disparate impact.
  • Manager training — ensuring supervisors understand legal boundaries and company policy.

Legal considerations when recruiting, hiring out-of-state WFH employees

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, employees working from home (WFH) have created a host of new wrinkles for employers, many of which are still being ironed out.

For employees, the WFH option can be safer (less chances of contracting COVID) and easier (no more commute); for employers, WFH reduces the cost of overhead and can result in happier, more productive employees.

While it may sound easy to simply hire a worker on the other side of the country, there are several legal questions for employers who want to recruit and hire an out-of-state employee who will WFH. The following are some of the important issues that employers should consider.

  • Recruiting. Looking for a new employee beyond state lines appears to present a limitless supply of potential new workers. But employers need to familiarize themselves with the laws of the state where the applicant lives, particularly with regard to issues such as background checks, criminal record searches and compensation.

Several states – including New Jersey and New York – prohibit employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s salary, benefits and other compensation history.

Other factors may make certain locations a more advantageous space to find new WFH hires.

Some states offer financial incentives to remote workers. Alabama, Georgia, Oklahoma and West Virginia offer bonuses to entice remote workers, ranging from reimbursement of moving expenses to $12,000 in cash (West Virginia will pay $10,000 divided over the course of 12 months with $2,000 paid at the end of the second year in residence).

  • Employee benefits and protections. Once an out-of-state employee has been hired to WFH, employers have a whole new list of individual state laws to learn. Each state has its own variations on employee benefits as well as legal protections – and in many cases, additional differences at the county and/or municipal level.

These differences can present the possibility of additional liability for employers on issues such as paid sick leave, paid family leave, minimum wage, disability, unemployment and vacation days, among others.

State laws on minimum wage vary widely, along with differences for tip credits and minimum salary thresholds for exemptions. The current minimum wage in Texas is $7.25 per hour, for example, while New York’s minimum wage is $11.00.

Paid family leave is now mandatory (or will be soon) in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington and Washington, D.C.

As for overtime, most states follow the standard payment of time-and-a-half for hours worked over 40 in a workweek, but a handful (including California) have more stringent requirements, while some states (California again) mandate that earned vacation days never expire.

Without a physical location in the state where a WFH employee resides and a breakroom to hang various notices, an employer must still remember to fulfill poster and notification obligations as well as various mandatory trainings. Remote employees do not need to tape posters up on their walls to satisfy state laws, but employers do need to provide certain information and documentation to out-of-state WFH employees to achieve compliance by sharing – and updating – federal, state and local notices.

Even if an employer has a single WFH employee in another state, workers’ compensation insurance is necessary, along with registration with the appropriate state agency. Some states have their own fund that employers must contribute into, while a third-party insurance company will suffice in others.

In addition, each state has different laws on employee protections, sometimes with variations at the local level. Employers should be careful to consider state, county and/or municipal statutes and regulations with regard to noncompete agreements, discrimination and retaliation protections and the requirements to legally terminate an employee.

  • Tax implications. Employees must be registered for tax purposes in the state where they reside, which means the company itself needs to register its presence in those states for tax purposes. That potentially newfound “tax nexus” to another state may mean sales and use taxes, income taxes and franchise taxes for the employer as well, depending on the requirements of the other state. The failure to properly register and pay the appropriate taxes can result in fines and penalties.

The registration process requires paperwork, time and patience, as it can take several weeks for an employee and the employer to be property registered. And some states – Pennsylvania, for example – also have local city or township registration requirements in addition to those at the state level.

Employers may also be subject to higher corporate income tax rates, which is calculated in part based on the employee’s role and seniority. So a WFH executive in a state with a high tax rate may cost an employer more money than a lower-level WFH employee in that state.

WFH employees themselves may face a tax conundrum with the “convenience of employer” rule that applies in seven states. In Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York and Pennsylvania, if an employee works in a different state than her employer by choice – not because the job mandates – then the employer’s state has the right to tax her, and the employer would be required to withhold taxes from her paycheck in both her home state and the employer’s.

Alternatively, some states have reciprocity agreements that expressly forbid this double taxation. A total of 16 states and Washington, D.C. have such deals, where an employee who lives in Wisconsin and works for an Illinois employer, for example, only pays income taxes in Wisconsin. States that have reached such agreements typically share a border, although Arizona has gone above and beyond, with reciprocity in California, Indiana, Oregon and Virginia.

One additional complication: some states have issued temporary guidance to deal with the out-of-state WFH situation during COVID. Alabama and Georgia stated that they would not enforce payroll withholding requirements for employees who are temporarily working from home due to government-mandated stay-at-home orders; Connecticut said that employees WFH due to the pandemic is a necessity for work but New York reached the opposite conclusion, stating that it is for the employee’s convenience.

Employers should consider all of the legal ramifications before hiring an out-of-state WFH employee.

November 16th, 2021|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|

REMINDER TO NYC EMPLOYERS: NEW REQUIREMENTS UNDER FAIR CHANCE ACT GO INTO EFFECT JULY 28, 2021

On January 10, 2021, the New York City Council passed an amendment (Local Law 4) to the city’s Fair Chance Act (FCA) which significantly expands protections for job applicants and employees. The amendment goes into effect July 28, 2021. Below are highlights of Local Law 4:

  • Expands scope of “criminal history” to include pending arrests and other criminal accusations.
    The FCA process must be used to determine if a pending arrest or other “criminal accusation” may be the basis to rescind a conditional job offer. Such rescission may only occur if, after considering the relevant fair chance factors “the employer determines that either (i) there is a direct relationship between the alleged wrongdoing that is the subject of the pending arrest or criminal accusation and the employment sought or held by the person; or (ii) the granting or continuation of the employment would involve an unreasonable risk to property or the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public.”
  • Adds new factors to the individual assessment for pending arrests or criminal charges, or convictions that occur during employment.
    Employers will have to consider the following factors, in lieu of the Article 23-A analysis:
  • The New York City policy “to overcome stigma toward and unnecessary exclusion of persons with criminal justice involvement in the areas of licensure and employment”;
  • the specific duties and responsibilities “necessarily related” to the job;
  • the bearing, if any, of the criminal offense or offenses for which the applicant or employee was convicted, or that are alleged in the case of pending arrests or criminal accusations, on the applicant’s or employee’s fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities;
  • whether the employee or applicant was 25 years of age or younger at the time the criminal offense(s) for which the person was convicted occurred, or that are alleged in the case of pending arrests or criminal accusations;
  • the seriousness of such offense(s);
  • the employer’s “legitimate interest” in “protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public”; and
  • any additional information produced by the applicant or employee, or produced on their behalf, regarding their rehabilitation or good conduct, including history of positive performance and conduct on the job or in the community, or any other evidence of good conduct.
  • Prohibits inquiries about specified criminal matters.
    At no time may an employer take an adverse action against an applicant or employee based on that person’s (i) violations; (ii) non-criminal offenses; (iii) non-pending arrests or criminal accusations; (iv) adjournments in contemplation of dismissal; (v) youthful offender adjudications; or (vi) sealed offenses, if disclosure of such matters would violate the New York State Human Rights Law.
  • Requires employers to solicit from the candidate information related to the FCA process.
    Currently, the FCA requires employers to only solicit evidence of rehabilitation and good conduct.
  • Expands the time for candidates to respond to the employer’s written assessment from three to five days.
  • Codifies guidance from the New York City Commission on Human Rights on revoking a conditional offer of employment.
    Employers may only revoke the conditional offer based on (i) the findings of a criminal background check following an individual assessment conducted pursuant to the FCA process, (ii) the results of a medical examination, consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act; or (iii) other information obtained by the employer after making the conditional offer, if the employer could not be reasonably expected to have that information prior to making the offer and the employer would not have made the offer if it had possessed such information.
  • Requires production of evidence to the applicant or employee where the employer takes adverse action pursuant to an alleged misrepresentation by the applicant or employee.
    Und3r the existing FCA, an employer may take adverse action against candidates who intentionally misrepresent information to the employer. The Law will continue to allow an employer to take such action, but will require the employer to provide to the candidate the documents or other materials that support the employer’s claim of misrepresentation and permit the individual a “reasonable” amount of time to respond prior to taking the adverse action.
June 10th, 2021|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , |

2021 UPDATE OF FCRA LITIGATION AND THE EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND SCREENING

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) lawsuits continue to rise with the number of complaints filed in federal courts showing a +5.3% increase in 2020 over 2019[1]. This continues a trend for FCRA litigation as it has consistently shown year-over-year growth since 2010. An issue that garners much attention in FCRA litigation is whether an employer’s disclosure and authorization forms violate the FCRA. Two federal appellate decisions address this issue and provide important guidance for employers on how to draft FCRA disclosure and authorization forms.

FCRA Disclosure and Authorization Forms

Employers that want to obtain a background check report about a job applicant or current employee must comply with the FCRA and provide to the individual a standalone document with a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the employer’s intention to do so, and obtain the individual’s authorization. By way of background, the principal appellate opinion on disclosure and authorization forms is the Ninth Circuit’s Gilberg v. California Check Cashing Stores, LLC, No. No. 17-16263 (January 2019). The Gilberg opinion made clear that any extraneous information in an FCRA disclosure form violates the FCRA’s requirement that the disclosure must be “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure” (the standalone requirement). The employer in Gilberg was found to have violated the standalone requirement by:

  1. Combining the authorization and disclosure into one document; and
  2. Including several state-related disclosures in the form.

Two important cases from 2020 that further addressed the requirements and limitations for the content of an FCRA disclosure form were issued by the Ninth Circuit in Walker v. Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 18-35592 (March 20, 2020) and Luna v. Hansen & Adkins Transport, Inc., No. 18-55804, (April 24, 2020).

In Walker v. Fred Meyer, the court indicated that background check disclosures may contain some concise explanatory language, but there is a limit to what is explanatory and what is unlawfully extraneous. Among other allegations, the plaintiff in Walker claimed that the FCRA disclosure violated the standalone requirement because, in addition to mentioning consumer reports, it also mentioned investigative consumer reports (a type of consumer report). The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim and ruled that mentioning investigative background checks in the disclosure does not violate the FCRA’s standalone requirement because investigative consumer reports are a subcategory or specific type of consumer report and as long as the investigative background check disclosures are limited to (1) disclosing that such reports may be obtained for employment purposes and (2) providing a very brief description of what that means.

The Ninth Circuit reviewed the employer’s disclosure in Walker in detail, which consisted of five paragraphs, and held that the first three paragraphs did not violate the standalone requirement, but that the last two paragraphs did because they may pull the individual’s attention away from their privacy rights protected by the FCRA. Here are the offending paragraphs in their entirety:

“You may inspect GIS’s files about you (in person, by mail, or by phone) by providing identification to GIS. If you do, GIS will provide you help to understand the files, including communication with trained personnel and an explanation of any codes. Another person may accompany you by providing identification.”

“If GIS obtains any information by interview, you have the right to obtain a complete and accurate disclosure of the scope and nature of the investigation performed.”

The plaintiff in Walker also claimed that the language of the employer’s authorization form, which was in a separate document was confusing and underscored the confusing and distracting nature of disclosure form, thus violating the FCRA’s standalone requirement. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because it found that the authorization form is not relevant to the FCRA disclosure form’s standalone requirement where the authorization is not included in the disclosure and is in a separate authorization form.

In Luna v. Hansen, the plaintiff claimed that the FCRA’s physical standalone requirement for hard-copy forms was a temporal one, i.e., the disclosure form should be presented to the individual separate from all other employment-related forms. The plaintiff in Luna had received one packet containing all forms. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and held that as long as the background check disclosure itself is in a standalone form, it can be presented with and at the same time as other employment documents.

Key Takeaways

Given the steady uptick in FCRA litigation, it is advisable for employers to review their FCRA disclosure and authorization forms on at least a yearly basis, or whenever important appellate opinions are issued, to ensure compliance with the FCRA. The attached forms from the Gilberg and Walker opinions provide clear examples of what to avoid in FCRA disclosure forms. In general, the guidance provided in the above-referenced opinions indicate that:

  • background check disclosure forms may contain some concise explanatory language, but there is a limit to what is explanatory and what is unlawfully extraneous;
  • background check disclosure forms may be presented at the same time as other materials, including application materials, as long as the background check disclosures are on a separate form; and
  • language in a separate authorization form has no impact on the disclosure form’s compliance with the FCRA standalone requirement.

[1] WebRecon Stats for Dec 2020 and Year in Review

Disclaimer: This communication is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. No recipient should act, or refrain from acting, based on any information provided here without advice from a qualified attorney licensed in the applicable jurisdiction.

March 23rd, 2021|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , , |

Pre-Employment Screening during the Pandemic

It is a standard practice for employers to run background checks on potential new hires. Such checks help employers protect their company by learning about the trustworthiness of the candidate through their financial, criminal, and driving records and education and employment verifications. But the pandemic has affected the operations of many institutions worldwide. From court closures to remote college campuses, it may be more difficult for the screening provider to check a criminal record or verify an educational background. Nonetheless, the possibility of delay should not cause employers to lower the standards of their screening policies.

The most important reason why an employer should not temporarily waive certain parts of a background check is because it may make it harder to justify its necessity in the future. For example, say a court is closed and is unable to provide information on candidates’ criminal history. Because of this, an employer who is anxious to add the new hire to the frontline chooses to waive the criminal check requirement. Well, when a court begins to provide legal information again and an employer decides to reinstate the criminal check requirement, the employer could face compliance issues.

Under current anti-discrimination laws, namely Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers must demonstrate that its hiring practices are “job related” and “consistent with business necessity.” But if an employer chooses to forgo the criminal checks during the pandemic and wishes to reinstate them later, they may be violating this law. Since the criminal check was once suspended, one could argue that the practice was not job related or that it was not a business necessity. Furthermore, streamlining the employment screening process by waiving certain aspects could lead an employer to overlook valuable insight into a candidate’s character. Therefore, while a shorter background check program during the pandemic could bring short-term benefits, it runs significant long-term risks.

So, what are your options?

We have outlined up two possible avenues available to employers during these times.

Hire now (but reserve the right to run future background checks)

If a company is in a position in which new hires are urgently needed, they may hire the candidates based on the information available to them at the time of the background check and reserve the right to conduct additional background checks post-hire, once information providers resume to normal operations. But if an employer takes this route, they must clearly communicate with both their background check provider and the new hire.

They should work with the background check provider to take note of those candidates whose checks are not yet completed so that the provider can easily revisit the report in the future. Employers should also make it clear in an employee’s offer letter that the offer of employment is contingent upon the successful completion of a background check that may occur at a later date.

Delay the hire

For employers who are required by law to complete background checks prior to a new hire’s start date, they may have to delay the worker’s start date. But whether a background check provider can access the required information for an employment screen depends on the location of the various sources of information, from the courthouses to the educational institutions.

All in all, although background checks may take longer during the pandemic, they are, especially now, critical to manage your risk. With the rising number of job seekers and the remote workforce, companies must do what they can to ensure that they are hiring qualified professionals who will be valuable additions to the company.

September 10th, 2020|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , |

The CFPB issues new policy guidance on credit reporting and dispute resolution

On April 1, 2020, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) issued a non-binding general policy statement (“Policy Statement”) regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and Regulation V in light of the recently enacted Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).

The CFPB’s Policy Statement highlights furnishers’ responsibilities and informs consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) of the Bureau’s flexible supervisory and enforcement approach during this pandemic. The Bureau intends to consider the circumstances that entities face as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and their good faith efforts to comply with statutory and regulatory obligations as soon as possible.

The Bureau believes that this flexibility will help furnishers and CRAs to manage the challenges of the current crisis. Below are examples of the flexibility the Bureau intends to provide in the consumer reporting system.

Furnishing consumer information impacted by COVID-19: The Bureau reiterates its prior guidance encouraging financial institutions to work constructively with borrowers and other customers affected by COVID-19 to meet their financial needs. While companies generally are not legally obligated to furnish information to CRAs, the Bureau encourages them to continue doing so despite the current crisis. Furnishers’ providing accurate information to CRAs produces substantial benefits for consumers, users of consumer reports, and the economy as a whole. The CARES Act, a section of which amends the FCRA, generally requires furnishers to report as current certain credit obligations for which furnishers make payment accommodations to consumers affected by COVID-19 who have sought such accommodations from their lenders. Many furnishers are or will be offering consumers affected by COVID-19 various forms of payment flexibility, including allowing consumers to defer or skip payments, as required by the CARES Act or voluntarily. Such payment accommodations will avoid the reporting of delinquencies resulting from the effects of COVID-19. The Bureau supports furnishers’ voluntary efforts to provide payment relief, and it does not intend to cite in examinations or take enforcement actions against those who furnish information to CRAs that accurately reflects the payment relief measures they are employing.

Disputes: The FCRA generally requires that CRAs and furnishers investigate disputes within 30 days of receipt of the consumer’s dispute. The 30-day period may be extended to 45 days if the consumer provides additional information that is relevant to the investigation during the 30-day period. The Bureau is aware that some CRAs and furnishers may face significant operational disruptions that pose challenges in the investigations. For example, some CRAs and furnishers may experience reductions in staff, difficulty in taking disputes, or lack of access to necessary information, rendering them unable to investigate the disputes within the timeframes the FCRA requires. Furnishers include a wide variety of businesses that vary in size and sophistication and can range from small retailers to very large financial services firms, each of which will face unique challenges due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In evaluating compliance with the FCRA as a result of the pandemic, the Bureau will consider a CRA’s or furnisher’s individual circumstances and does not intend to cite in an examination or bring an enforcement action against a CRA or furnisher making good faith efforts to investigate disputes as quickly as possible, even if dispute investigations take longer than the statutory timeframe. The Bureau reminds furnishers and CRAs that they may take advantage of statutory and regulatory provisions that eliminate the obligation to investigate disputes submitted by credit repair organizations and disputes they reasonably determine to be frivolous or irrelevant. The Bureau will consider the current constraints on furnishers’ and CRAs’ time, information, and other resources in assessing if such a determination is reasonable.

Regulatory requirements: The Policy Statement is a non-binding general statement of policy articulating considerations relevant to the Bureau’s exercise of its supervisory and enforcement authorities. It is therefore exempt from the notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to 5 USC 553(b).

Resources for consumers and small businesses facing the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are available on the Bureau’s website at https://www.consumerfinance.gov/coronavirus/.

April 3rd, 2020|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , |

Q1 2020: UPDATE OF LAWS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND SCREENING

As the year and a new decade unfold, we bring you this update on ban-the-box legislation and laws that restrict credit report usage in employment decisions. And no update would be complete without a reminder about a standard-setting federal appellate opinion from 2019 interpreting the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) disclosure requirement for an employment background check.

Let’s start with a reminder

In January 2019, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gilberg v. California Check Cashing Stores, LLC made clear that any extraneous information in an FCRA disclosure form regarding an employment background check — even if the information is related to state-mandated expansions of consumer rights — violates the FCRA’s requirement that the disclosure must be “in a document that consists solely of the disclosure.

Even seemingly innocuous content, such as asking for an acknowledgment that the candidate received the FCRA summary of rights or including a statement that hiring decisions are based on legitimate non-discriminatory reasons may run afoul of the FCRA. And any state and local notices regarding the background check must be provided in separate documents, as applicable to each candidate.

Experts believe that the number of class-action lawsuits brought under the FCRA for technical errors will continue to increase. But there is an easy way to comply:

Present the disclosure to the candidate in a separate, standalone, conspicuous document. Make it clear and simple. Keep it short.

Ban-the-box laws continue to proliferate

“Ban-the-box” measures – which generally prohibit employers from inquiring about a candidate’s criminal history (including performing background checks) until later in the hiring process – continue to proliferate. Currently, 14 states (California; Colorado; Connecticut; Hawaii; Illinois; Maryland (effective February 29, 2020); Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Jersey; New Mexico; Oregon; Rhode Island; Vermont and Washington) and 22 local jurisdictions (Austin, TX ; Baltimore, MD; Buffalo, NY; Chicago, IL; Cook County, IL; Columbia, MO; District of Columbia; Grand Rapids, MI; Kansas City, MO; Los Angeles, CA; Montgomery County, MD; New York City, NY;  Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Prince George’s County, MD; Rochester, NY; Saint Louis, MO (effective January 1, 2021); San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; Spokane, WA; Waterloo, IA (effective July 1, 2020 but lawsuit filed to strike down the ordinance); and Westchester County, NY) have such laws in place for private employers.

Be mindful of credit restrictions

Less popular than state and local legislatures on ban-the-box and prohibitions on salary history inquiries, credit check restrictions remain an important consideration for employers. Ten states California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington – as well as Chicago, District of Columbia, New York City, and Philadelphia all place restrictions on employers’ use of credit reports with exceptions for the use of such checks when required by law or the responsibilities of the position.      

Arguably, the most imposing local credit report law to date continues to be the New York City’s Human Rights amendment that went into effect on May 6, 2015, and made requesting and using consumer credit history for hiring and other employment purposes, with certain exceptions, an unlawful discriminatory practice. The law provides that a “consumer credit report” includes “any written or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency that bears on a consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, credit capacity or credit history.”Many legal experts hold that the broad scope of this definition not only prohibits obtaining a consumer credit report but also searches of liens, judgments, bankruptcies, and financially-related lawsuits if there is no exemption. There is no case law on this matter. 

On the national level, the U.S. House of Representatives on January 29, 2020, passed legislation that prohibits employers from using credit reports for employment decisions, except when required by law or for a national security clearance. The bill also prohibits asking questions about applicants’ financial past during job interviews or including questions about credit history on job applications. The U.S. Senate, however, is not expected to introduce the legislation.

March 6th, 2020|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , , , |

Ninth Circuit Defines “Standalone, Clear and Conspicuous” Disclosure for Obtaining Employment-Purpose Background Checks

On January 29, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Gilberg v. California Check Cashing Stores, LLC instructed employers about the importance of complying with background check disclosure requirements found in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).

Pursuant to the federal statute, employers who want to obtain a consumer report (commonly referred to as a background check report) on a job candidate must provide to the candidate a “clear and conspicuous disclosure” about the report in a document that consists “solely of the disclosure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).

But when Desiree Gilberg applied for a job with CheckSmart Financial, she received something different. First Gilberg completed a three-page form containing an employment application, a math screening and an employment history verification. She then signed a separate form entitled, “Disclosure Regarding Background Investigation.”

The one-page form included the required FCRA disclosure as well as mandated state disclosures for California, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington.

Gilberg worked for CheckSmart for five months before voluntarily leaving the job. She then filed a putative class action against the company, alleging that it failed to make proper disclosures as set forth in both the FCRA and California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA).

A district court sided with the employer and dismissed the case. The judge agreed with CheckSmart that its disclosure form complied with both statutes. Gilberg appealed to the Ninth Circuit. She argued that the standalone requirement didn’t permit the combination of state and federal disclosures as CheckSmart had tried.

Considering the issue, the Ninth Circuit recalled a 2017 decision in Syed v. M-I, LLC. In that case, which also involved the standalone requirement, the federal appellate panel held that a prospective employer violated the FCRA when it included a liability waiver in the same document as the mandated disclosure. The statute means what it says, the court emphasized: the required disclosure must be in a document that “consist

[s] ‘solely’ of the disclosure.”

In an effort to distinguish its disclosure from that in the Syed case, CheckSmart told the court that the additional information in its form actually furthered the FCRA’s purpose.

“We disagree,” the court wrote. “Syed’s holding and statutory analysis were not limited to liability waivers; Syed considered the standalone requirement with regard to any surplusage. Syed grounded its analysis of the liability waiver in its statutory analysis of the word ‘solely,’ noting that FCRA should not be read to have implied exceptions, especially when the exception – in that case, a liability waiver – was contrary to FCRA’s purpose. Syed also cautioned ‘against finding additional, implied exceptions’ simply because Congress had created one exception. Consistent with Syed, we decline CheckSmart’s invitation to create an implied exception here.”

Plain meaning trumps purpose, the Ninth Circuit said, rejecting the employer’s contention that its disclosure form was consistent with the intent of the FCRA. Since the surplus language included disclosures required by various state laws that were inapplicable to Gilberg, the court was unable to understand how the CheckSmart form comported with the purpose of the federal statute.

“Because the presence of this extraneous information is as likely to confuse as it is to inform, it does not further FCRA’s purpose,” the court declared.

“Syed holds that the standalone requirement forecloses implicit exceptions,” the panel wrote. “The statute’s one express exception does not apply here, and CheckSmart’s disclosure contains extraneous and irrelevant information beyond what FCRA itself requires. The disclosure, therefore, violates FCRA’s standalone document requirement. Even if congressional purpose were relevant, much of the surplusage in CheckSmart’s disclosure form does not effectuate the purposes of the FCRA.”

In addition to ruling that the district court erred in concluding that the employer’s disclosure form satisfied the FCRA’s standalone document requirement, the Ninth Circuit also held that CheckSmart’s disclosure form was not “clear and conspicuous” under either FCRA or ICRAA.

The court grudgingly found the form to be “conspicuous” (despite characterizing the font as “inadvisably” small and cramped) but held it was not “clear.” The disclosure contained language a reasonable person would not understand, the court said, and its content would confuse a reader with the combination of federal and state disclosures.

As “CheckSmart’s disclosure form was not both clear and conspicuous, the district erred in granting CheckSmart’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the FCRA and ICRAA ‘clear and conspicuous’ requirements,” the panel wrote. The Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of Gilberg’s complaint and remanded the case to the California district court. (As of this writing, there is a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending before the 9th Circuit.)

For employers, the Ninth Circuit opinion could not be more clear: ensure that the FCRA disclosure form provided to job candidates contains no extraneous or surplus language. The decision also provides an important reminder about keeping disclosures forms clear and conspicuous in order to comply with both federal and state laws.

Pursuant to the federal statute, employers who want to obtain a consumer report (commonly referred to as a background check report) on a job candidate must provide to the candidate a “clear and conspicuous disclosure” about the report in a document that consists “solely of the disclosure.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).

But when Desiree Gilberg applied for a job with CheckSmart Financial, she received something different. First Gilberg completed a three-page form containing an employment application, a math screening and an employment history verification. She then signed a separate form entitled, “Disclosure Regarding Background Investigation.”

The one-page form included the required FCRA disclosure as well as mandated state disclosures for California, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington.

Gilberg worked for CheckSmart for five months before voluntarily leaving the job. She then filed a putative class action against the company, alleging that it failed to make proper disclosures as set forth in both the FCRA and California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA).

A district court sided with the employer and dismissed the case. The judge agreed with CheckSmart that its disclosure form complied with both statutes. Gilberg appealed to the Ninth Circuit. She argued that the standalone requirement didn’t permit the combination of state and federal disclosures as CheckSmart had tried.

Considering the issue, the Ninth Circuit recalled a 2017 decision in Syed v. M-I, LLC. In that case, which also involved the standalone requirement, the federal appellate panel held that a prospective employer violated the FCRA when it included a liability waiver in the same document as the mandated disclosure. The statute means what it says, the court emphasized: the required disclosure must be in a document that “consist[s] ‘solely’ of the disclosure.”

In an effort to distinguish its disclosure from that in the Syed case, CheckSmart told the court that the additional information in its form actually furthered the FCRA’s purpose.

“We disagree,” the court wrote. “Syed’s holding and statutory analysis were not limited to liability waivers; Syed considered the standalone requirement with regard to any surplusage. Syed grounded its analysis of the liability waiver in its statutory analysis of the word ‘solely,’ noting that FCRA should not be read to have implied exceptions, especially when the exception – in that case, a liability waiver – was contrary to FCRA’s purpose. Syed also cautioned ‘against finding additional, implied exceptions’ simply because Congress had created one exception. Consistent with Syed, we decline CheckSmart’s invitation to create an implied exception here.”

Plain meaning trumps purpose, the Ninth Circuit said, rejecting the employer’s contention that its disclosure form was consistent with the intent of the FCRA. Since the surplus language included disclosures required by various state laws that were inapplicable to Gilberg, the court was unable to understand how the CheckSmart form comported with the purpose of the federal statute.

“Because the presence of this extraneous information is as likely to confuse as it is to inform, it does not further FCRA’s purpose,” the court declared.

“Syed holds that the standalone requirement forecloses implicit exceptions,” the panel wrote. “The statute’s one express exception does not apply here, and CheckSmart’s disclosure contains extraneous and irrelevant information beyond what FCRA itself requires. The disclosure therefore violates FCRA’s standalone document requirement. Even if congressional purpose were relevant, much of the surplusage in CheckSmart’s disclosure form does not effectuate the purposes of the FCRA.”

In addition to ruling that the district court erred in concluding that the employer’s disclosure form satisfied the FCRA’s standalone document requirement, the Ninth Circuit also held that CheckSmart’s disclosure form was not “clear and conspicuous” under either FCRA or ICRAA.

The court grudgingly found the form to be “conspicuous” (despite characterizing the font as “inadvisably” small and cramped) but held it was not “clear.” The disclosure contained language a reasonable person would not understand, the court said, and its content would confuse a reader with the combination of federal and state disclosures.

As “CheckSmart’s disclosure form was not both clear and conspicuous, the district erred in granting CheckSmart’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the FCRA and ICRAA ‘clear and conspicuous’ requirements,” the panel wrote. The Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of Gilberg’s complaint and remanded the case to the California district court. (As of this writing, there is a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending before the 9th Circuit.)

For employers, the Ninth Circuit opinion could not be more clear: ensure that the FCRA disclosure form provided to job candidates contains no extraneous or surplus language. The decision also provides an important reminder about keeping disclosures forms clear and conspicuous in order to comply with both federal and state laws.

March 2nd, 2019|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , |

Independent contractors and the FCRA

Must employers provide the protections required by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to prospective independent contractors? 

Not according to a new decision from an Iowa court (see Smith v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, No. 4:17-cv-00443 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 4, 2018)) which grappled with the question in the context of a lawsuit filed by an individual against an insurance company where he applied to contract as a salesperson but was rejected because of a falsely reported felony in his background check. The plaintiff accused the insurance company of violating the FCRA by failing to provide him with the statutorily required prior notice that the background check resulted in his not being hired.    

The insurance company asked the court to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming that the FCRA only requires such notice when an applicant seeks to be hired as an employee, and not as an independent contractor. Since the plaintiff applied for an independent contractor position, he was not entitled to the protections of the statute, the insurance company argued. 

The plaintiff countered that he was applying to be an employee of the insurance company and that it was too early to dismiss the case, as further discovery was needed. In the alternative, he argued that the FCRA should still govern his relationship even as an independent contractor.

In ruling on the FCRA issue, Judge John Jarvey began with the language of the law. The FCRA is a broad statute, Judge Jarvey said, and some of its most stringent protections apply when a background check is being obtained “for employment purposes.” 

The definitions section of the FCRA, at 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h), states that “

[t]he term ‘employment purposes’ when used in connection with a consumer report means a report used for the purpose of evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee.” This text “makes clear that the pre-adverse action notice requirement only applies when a consumer report is used for employment purposes,” Judge Jarvey wrote. “The meaning of ‘employment purposes’ is specifically defined in the statute, and it is defined as being ‘used for the purpose of evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion, reassignment or retention as an employee.’”  District courts in Ohio and Wisconsin have reached the same conclusion, Judge Jarvey noted, citing the decisions for support. 

Notably, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its 2011 staff report entitled “40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act” provided a seemingly contrasting interpretation. The FTC stated that “the term ‘employment purposes’ is interpreted liberally to effectuate the broad remedial purpose of the FCRA and may apply to situations where an entity uses individuals who are not technically employees to perform duties. Thus, it includes a trucking company that obtains consumer reports on individual drivers who own and operate their own equipment; a title insurance company that obtains consumer reports on individuals with whom it frequently enters into contracts to sell its insurance, examine title, and close real property transactions; or a nonprofit organization staffed in whole or in part by volunteers.” 

The FTC’s view can be reconciled with that of Judge Jarvey’s by taking the approach that the applicability of FCRA’s requirements depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular relationship, rather than the formal designation of someone as an independent contractor. 

Given the still remaining disputed issue of whether or not the plaintiff would have been an employee or an independent contractor for the insurance company, the court ordered limited discovery on the issue and declined to dismiss the suit. 

January 2nd, 2019|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , , |

New Draft Guidelines Attempt to Clarify Territorial Scope of the GDPR

Since the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by the European Union (EU) in May 2018, businesses established outside of the EU have grappled with the question of whether the GDPR’s strict rules apply to them. Many commentators have noted that the GDPR provisions and recitals do not have an easy answer. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) recently attempted to provide some clarification by publishing draft guidelines that include a commentary on the territorial scope of the GDPR. The EDPB’s guidelines also address the related issue of whether a non-EU company subject to the GDPR must have an EU-based representative.

GDPR’s Targeting Criteria

Arguably the most significant change to the regulatory landscape affecting an individual’s data privacy is the territorial scope of the GDPR’s Article 3 (2). Generally described as the GDPR’s “targeting criteria,” your business must be GDPR compliant if it engages in processing activities of an EU individual’s data (data subject) related to (1) offering goods or services to data subjects, or (2) monitoring data subjects’ behavior. Although the EDPB’s guidelines state that the targeting criteria is applied on a case-by-case basis, the guidelines provide several examples showing how the targeting criteria can be applied that clarify some basic points, such as:

  1. The data subject’s nationality or citizenship is irrelevant. The GDPR protects data subjects geographically located within the EU, without regard to the data subject’s nationality or citizenship. Conversely, data subjects outside of the EU, including EU citizens, are not protected by the GDPR.
  2. Geographic allocation and timing are critical. For purposes of applying the GDPR, thedata subject’s geographic location is assessed atthe moment when your activity occurs; e.g., when your goods or services are offered, or your monitoring of the datasubject’s behavior begins.
  3. Charging for services is irrelevant. The GDPR protects data subjects regardless of whether your services are free.
  4. Cookies are considered monitoring. TheGDPR protects data subjects that your business profiles or undertakes someanalysis by using cookies or similar technologies.

GDPR Compliance and an EU-based Representative

A significant point clarified by the EDPB’s guidelines is that a non-EU company subject to the GDPR must appoint an EU-based representative, even though the not have a physical location within the EU. A company’s Data Protection Officer, who can be an existing employee of the company under the GDPR, cannot fulfill the requirements for an EU-based representative. The purpose of the requirement is to ensure that a qualified individual or entity is located within the EU to whom regulatory authorities can address compliance issues. The guidelines also make clear that the EU-based representative can even be held liable for any non-compliance, including being fined or otherwise sanctioned.

Consultation Period

The territorial scope and appointment of an EU-based representative poses two of the most critical issues that a non-EU based company faces regarding GDPR compliance. The EDPB’s draft guidelines address several other GDPR issues in addition to these, and a full version of the guidelines can be found here. The EDPB is taking public comments on the draft guidelines until January 18, 2019. Comments should be sent to the EDPB at EDPB@edpb.europa.eu.

December 12th, 2018|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , , , , , |

California’s overlapping background check laws

For many years, employers have struggled with California’s overlapping statutes governing the use of background checks. Now, the state’s highest court has weighed in, ruling that compliance with the requirements of both laws is mandatory, even where the laws overlap.

A little history is necessary to understand the situation. In 1970, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The law defined the term “consumer report” to include an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.” The FCRA distinguished between consumer reports that contained information obtained by personal interviews and consumer reports gathered by other means.

The California legislature responded with two state analogues in 1975: the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) and the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA). Modeled on the FCRA, the statutes had similar purposes and were intended to serve complementary goals.

As originally enacted, the ICRAA applied to consumer reports that included character information obtained only through personal interviews. It defined an “investigative consumer report” as one “in which information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living is obtained through any means.” The statute requires that the person procuring the report provide the consumer a “clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing” and that the consumer in turn provide a written authorization for the report’s procurement.

Lawmakers took a slightly different approach with CCRAA, which defined a “consumer credit report” as “any written, oral or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or is expected to be used … for … employment purposes.” The definition excluded “any report containing information solely on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer reported on, or others with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information.”

In 1998, the California legislature amended ICRAA to eliminate the personal interview limitation and expand the statute’s scope to include character information obtained under CCRAA or “obtained through any means.”

Since then, CCRAA continues to govern consumer reports that include character information obtained from a source other than personal interviews, as long as those reports contain information “bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity.”

What does all this mean for employers? And how did the California Supreme Court get involved?

The two statutes came to the attention of the court when a group of current and former school bus drivers filed suit against their employers, First Student and First Transit, as well as the investigative consumer reporting agency (ICRA) that conducted background checks on the drivers. Eileen Connor led the class action.

After First Student acquired the company where Connor worked as a driver, it requested that the ICRA run background checks to confirm that Connor and the other workers were properly qualified to perform their job duties. The background reports elicited information about the employees’ criminal records, sex offender registries, address history, driving records and employment history.

Prior to conducting the background checks, First Student sent Connor a “Safety Packet” booklet. The booklet included an “Investigative Consumer Report Disclosure and Release” that provided authorization for the ICRA to prepare a consumer report or investigative consumer report. The notice included a checkbox that generally described Connor’s rights under ICRAA, informed her that she could check the box if she wanted to receive a copy of the report and released First Student from all claims and damages arising out of or relating to its background investigation if the box was checked.

Connor filed suit, arguing that the notice failed to satisfy ICRAA’s specific requirements and that First Student neglected to obtain her written authorization to conduct the background check, as required by ICRAA.

First Student asked the court to dismiss the suit, arguing that ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the lawsuit because it overlaps with CCRAA and that the notice satisfied CCRAA.

The California Supreme Court found that while the statutes overlap to some degree, achieving compliance with both did not render ICRAA unconstitutional. The two statutes were not intended to be exclusive of each other, the court said, and potential employers can comply with both statutes without undermining the purpose of either.

“If an employer seeks a consumer’s credit records exclusively, then the employer need only comply with CCRAA,” the court explained. “An employer seeking other information that is obtained by any means must comply with ICRAA. In the event that any other information revealed in an ICRAA background check contains a subject’s credit information and the two statutes thus overlap, a regulated party is expected to know and follow the requirements of both statutes, even if that requires greater formality in obtaining a consumer’s credit records.”

First Student complained that because the ICRAA and CCRAA cover the same subject matter, it was unclear which statute applied in the context of employment background checks. But the court disagreed. Connor’s report, for example, fell within the scope of both statutes and “such a duality does not make legal compliance particularly difficult, must less impossible,” the court said.

“Any partial overlap between the statutes does not render one superfluous or unconstitutionally vague,” the court wrote. “They can coexist because both acts are sufficiently clear and each act regulates information that the other does not.”

The California Supreme Court opinion was a loss for First Student and the ICRA, as the court found the defendants had no excuse for not complying with both statutes. For employers more generally, the decision sends an important message: compliance with the requirements of both ICRAA and CCRAA is mandatory, even where the two statutes overlap.

October 1st, 2018|Categories: Compliance Corner for Employment Decisions|Tags: , , , , |
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